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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge: 
 Alexander Navedo appeals the denial of a motion to 
suppress weapons that police discovered in his home after a 
warrantless arrest.  He argues that he was detained without 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to arrest and that the 
weapons that were subsequently recovered from his 
apartment should therefore have been suppressed.  We agree.  
 
I.   BACKGROUND 
 
 On March 3, 2010, Henry Suarez and Saul DeLaCruz, 
two Newark Police Department detectives, set up surveillance 
in front of 315 Park Avenue in Newark, New Jersey.  They 
were in plain clothes and driving an unmarked car.  Although 
they were in front of 315 Park Avenue, they were actually 
investigating a shooting that had occurred at 323 Park Avenue 
two months earlier in January.  315 Park Avenue is a multi-
unit building located in a mixed residential and industrial 
neighborhood.  The officers arrived at approximately 7:30 to 
8:00 pm; street lights were on and the streets were well 
illuminated when they arrived.   
 
The area is not a “high crime area,” and the police did 
not have a description of anyone involved in the January 
shooting.
1
  Before arriving and setting up their surveillance, 
                                              
1
 In addition to the shooting in January, the government relies 
on a February 3, 2010 weapons complaint to police by a 
3 
 
the police had no knowledge or information whatsoever about 
Alexander Navedo.  Rather, Officer Suarez testified that they 
set up surveillance in the area and maintained a presence 
because of concerns that there may be some kind of 
retaliation for the January shooting.  J.A. at 32.  
 
At approximately 8:30 pm, the detectives saw a man 
(later identified as Navedo) come out of the entrance to 315 
Park Avenue and stand on the porch, approximately twenty to 
thirty feet from their unmarked parked car.  Officer Suarez 
testified that Navedo was not doing anything unusual.  Soon 
thereafter, a person later identified as Co-defendant Pozo, 
approached Navedo from the street.  Pozo was carrying a 
bookbag, and Navedo walked down to speak with him.  
According to Officer DeLaCruz‟s suppression testimony, the 
conversation seemed cordial and friendly, and nobody 
appeared threatened or threatening.  J.A. at 84.  After a few 
minutes, Pozo took the bag he was carrying off his shoulder, 
reached inside it, and pulled out an object.  The officers then 
observed Pozo holding what looked like a silver gun with a 
black handle.  Navedo never touched or possessed the gun.  In 
fact, it never left Pozo‟s hands, and neither officer observed 
any conduct that would have suggested that Navedo was 
doing anything illegal.
2
 According to Detective Suarez‟s 
testimony at the suppression hearing, right before the police 
                                                                                                     
woman claiming that her boyfriend threatened her with a gun, 
to support its contention that reasonable suspicion existed as 
to Navedo.  See Appellee Br. at 2, 15; Reply Br. at 1-2.  But 
as discussed below, despite these isolated incidents—none of 
which involved Navedo—nothing in the record supports a 
finding this neighborhood was a high crime area, and the 
District Court made no such finding. 
2
 Detective Suarez testified that “[w]e didn‟t know what was 
going on at that time, all we  saw was just the weapon and 
two individuals walking up to the single person on the porch.  
So, that‟s why we decided to get out of the vehicle.”  J.A. at 
50.  He further explained: “we wasn‟t going to wait until he 
actually pulled the gun out completely.  We wanted to have 
the advantage, that‟s why we jumped out of our vehicle to 
make sure they didn‟t go any further than that and tried to 
keep that weapon inside the bag.”  Id. at 51.  
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approached the group, Navedo “was just leaning forward to 
see what was inside the bag.” J.A. at 52. 
 
 Upon seeing what they believed was a gun, the officers 
got out of their car and approached Navedo, Pozo, and Pozo‟s 
companion.  As they approached a fence surrounding the 
building, the officers identified themselves.  The officers 
were able to clearly see that the object Pozo had in his 
bookbag was indeed a gun before Pozo quickly threw it back 
into his bag and ran.  Detective Suarez chased Pozo and 
ultimately overtook him and placed him under arrest.  
 
As Detective Suarez was pursuing Pozo, Navedo ran 
up the stairs to his home with  Officer DeLaCruz pursuing 
him into the building and up some stairs.  DeLaCruz testified 
that he chased Navedo into the house because he (the 
detective) thought Navedo was involved in an illegal gun 
transaction.  J.A. at 88.  As he chased Navedo, DeLaCruz 
yelled: “Police.  Stop.”  J.A. at 69.  With DeLaCruz in 
pursuit, Navedo climbed two flights of stairs, reached the 
third floor, and attempted to open the door to his apartment.  
As Navedo was opening the front door to his apartment, he 
was tackled by DeLaCruz.  Officer DeLaCruz testified that 
“the physical contact was as [Navedo] was opening his front 
door—or his door to his apartment . . . .”  J.A. at 92.    The 
following exchange occurred during the suppression hearing:  
 
Q.  And as you chased him up to the third floor, the 
door that he turned towards, when he got there, was it 
opened or closed? 
A.  From my vantage point, I saw him turn it open.   
Q.  Okay.  And so when you—when you tackled him, 
was that door opened or closed? 
A.  It was opened.   
J.A. at 69-70.  
 
After DeLaCruz tackled Navedo, both men fell to the 
ground and landed inside the apartment.  Officer DeLaCruz 
testified that he handcuffed Navedo, and then observed a 
shotgun, two long rifles on the bed, one on the floor, and a 
stock of ammunition on the floor.  He explained:  
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After I detained the defendant, after I detained 
him, during the small little encounter, that‟s 
when I observed like a shotgun on the bed, 
two—two long rifles on the bed, one on the 
floor, and just an enormous amount of 
ammunition on the floor.  At that point in time, 
we both stood up, I was able to detain him 
quickly. 
 
J.A. 70.
3
 
 
After hearing the testimony of the two detectives, 
Navedo, and a defense witness, the court denied Navedo‟s 
suppression motion.  The court ruled that the officers had 
reasonable suspicion to stop Navedo and to question him 
because Navedo was looking at a weapon in Pozo‟s bag.  The 
District Court reasoned that Navedo‟s flight elevated the 
reasonable suspicion that justified the initial approach to 
“probable cause for arrest and justified entry” into the 
apartment under the theory of hot pursuit.  J.A. at 142.  The 
court ruled that the physical evidence obtained inside 
Navedo‟s apartment was admissible because there was 
probable cause to arrest Navedo, based upon his flight.  The 
court explained: “The individuals ran, creating probable cause 
for arrest and justified entry, hot pursuit into the apartment.  
There certainly was a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, combined with flight looking at the totality of the 
circumstances.”  Id.  The Court then summarized: “I do find 
probable cause here based upon the reasonable suspicion, 
together with the flight.”  Id. at 144. 
 
 Navedo was charged with illegally possessing the 
weapons that were recovered from inside his apartment, and 
those weapons were admitted against him to support the sole 
count upon which he was tried and convicted.  Navedo now 
appeals the resulting conviction.
4
  
                                              
3
 It appears that the District Court found that the third person 
escaped.  See J.A. at 140. 
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
Our review is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
We review a district court‟s order denying a motion to 
suppress under a mixed standard of review, exercising 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
 
 As we noted at the outset, Navedo‟s sole contention on 
appeal is that the District Court erred in denying his 
suppression motion.  He claims that the police did not have 
probable cause to arrest and therefore the evidence that was 
seized upon their warrantless  entry into his apartment should 
have been suppressed.  
 
A. GOVERNING PRINCIPLES. 
 
 The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.   
  
 The Fourth Amendment thus requires a warrant based 
upon probable cause before police can arrest someone 
(subject to certain exceptions).  “While probable cause to 
arrest requires more than mere suspicion, the law recognizes 
that probable cause determinations have to be made „on the 
spot‟ under pressure and do „not require the fine resolution of 
conflicting evidence [required at a trial].‟”  Paff v. 
Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975)).  
 
However, the realities of law enforcement allow police 
officers to briefly detain an individual based upon “articulable 
suspicion” and then to perform a limited protective 
“patdown” for weapons during that detention “where a police 
                                                                                                     
plenary review over legal determinations and reviewing 
findings of fact for clear error.  United States v. Lewis, 672 
F.3d 232, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably 
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity 
may be afoot .”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).   
Although the limited protective search or patdown is allowed 
if the officer has “reasonable grounds” to believe that a 
person is “armed and dangerous,” the Fourth Amendment 
limits the scope of that search.  Id.  It must be a “carefully 
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an 
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault 
him [or her].”  Id.        
 
The brief investigative detention is permissible if  “the 
police officer [can] point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”  Id. 
  
 In evaluating whether reasonable suspicion existed, a 
court “must consider the totality of the circumstances, 
including the police officer‟s knowledge, experience, and 
common sense judgments about human behavior.”  United 
States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002).
5
 
  
 The reasonable suspicion required under Terry is 
specific to the person who is detained.  The circumstances 
“must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being 
stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.”  United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).  The Supreme Court has never 
viewed Terry as a general license to detain everyone within 
arm‟s reach of  the individual whose conduct gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion.  Rather, the Court has stressed that 
“[t]his demand for specificity in the information upon which 
police action is predicated is the central teaching of this 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”  Id.  (alteration in 
original) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
  
 We do not suggest that the officers had to sit idly by 
without approaching and investigating merely because they 
could not be certain about what was transpiring.  However, 
                                              
5
 We need not reach Appellant‟s argument that the District 
Court improperly accepted the testimony of the testifying 
officers over witnesses more sympathetic to Navedo.  
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given the limitations on investigative detentions under Terry, 
and the Court‟s clear pronouncement in Cortez, they could 
not detain Navedo merely because their reasonable suspicions 
justified a brief investigative detention of Pozo.  
 
The detectives conceded during the suppression 
hearing that they had no information about Navedo.  In 
addition, the detectives conceded that when they left their 
unmarked car to investigate, Navedo had until then merely 
looked at the gun that Pozo was showing him and engaged in 
brief conversation with Pozo and his companion.  J.A. at 41-
47.  That would not justify a reasonable suspicion as to 
Navedo without more than appears on this record. 
 
We are mindful that “reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity may be formed by observing exclusively legal 
activity.”  United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 
2000).  However, that does not negate the limitations endemic 
in Terry as the Court emphasized in Cortez.   
 
Here, police did not have any information from any 
source that would have supported a reasonable suspicion that 
Navedo was involved in firearms trafficking or that he 
intended to purchase a gun from Pozo.  As we have just 
noted, the officers knew of nothing that would have suggested 
Navedo was connected to any prior criminal activity.
6
   His 
residence at 315 Park Avenue was not even the focus of 
police surveillance.  That surveillance was aimed at the 
building at 323 Park Avenue.  A shooting had been reported 
                                              
6
 For reasons known only to the Government, the Assistant 
United States Attorney who drafted the Appellees‟s brief in 
this case saw fit to inform this Court that: “[p]rior to this 
incident, Navedo had amassed a significant criminal record, 
including convictions for endangering the welfare of a child, 
grand theft auto, and possession of controlled dangerous 
substances.”  Appellee Br. at 3.  However, the Government 
does not suggest that either of the detectives involved in this 
case had any prior knowledge of any of the individuals 
involved in this case including Navedo, and the record here is 
clearly to the contrary.  We therefore are at a loss to 
understand why the Government would think it relevant or 
proper to include such a gratuitous statement in its brief.   
9 
 
at that address, and the shooting was not even that recent.  
The stop here appears to be based on nothing more than an 
attempt to transfer the reasonable suspicion the police had as 
to Pozo onto Navedo.
7
  Yet, as the Supreme Court explained 
in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979), “a person‟s mere 
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal 
activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to 
search that person .”  There, the Court stated: 
“Notwithstanding the absence of probable cause to search 
Ybarra, the State argues that the action of the police in 
searching him and seizing what was found in his pocket was 
nonetheless constitutionally permissible. . . . We are unable to 
take even the first step required by this argument.”   Id. at 92.  
Although the Court in Ybarra was discussing probable cause 
to arrest rather than the reasonable suspicion for a stop under 
Terry, the Court‟s pronouncement is equally applicable to this 
situation.  See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49-52 (1979). 
  
 Here, the District Court concluded that Navedo‟s flight 
gave rise to the police probable cause to arrest.  Accordingly, 
we must determine whether flight under the circumstances 
here, gave Detective DeLaCruz probable cause to arrest 
Navedo.
8
   
 
B. NAVEDO’S FLIGHT. 
                                              
7
 Navedo concedes the police officers may have had at least 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of Pozo based 
on his possession of a weapon.  See Reply Br. at 5-6 (“While 
Pozo‟s possession of the gun clearly called for reasonable 
suspicion, if not probable cause, to detain Pozo, these factors 
simply do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Navedo 
was doing anything other than standing next to Pozo.”).   
8
 Detective DeLaCruz‟s testimony regarding the arrest was 
not very precise.  However, it appears from his testimony that 
he “detained” Navedo before he saw the guns which would 
have been in plain view after Navedo opened his door while 
fleeing into his apartment from the detective.  J.A. at 69-70.  
However, since we conclude that there was no probable cause 
to arrest Navedo in the first place, we need not attempt to 
determine whether DeLaCruz saw the weapons before or after 
he arrested him.  
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In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), the 
Supreme Court discussed when “unprovoked flight” could 
lead to a warrantless arrest.  There, officers patrolling an area 
known for heavy narcotics trafficking observed Wardlow 
holding an opaque bag as he stood next to a building.  Id. at 
121-22.  Wardlow fled after seeing the police officers, but 
two of the officers caught up with him, and briefly detained 
him.  Id. at 122.  Upon stopping him, they conducted a 
patdown search for their own protection because, in their 
experience, “it was common for there to be weapons in the 
near vicinity of narcotics transactions.”  Id.  While conducting 
the patdown an officer “squeezed the bag [Wardlow] was 
carrying and felt a heavy, hard object similar to the shape of a 
gun.”  Id.  Inside that bag, the officers discovered a .38-
caliber handgun with five live rounds of ammunition and they 
arrested Wardlow.  Id. 
  
 The trial court denied Wardlow‟s suppression motion 
and he appealed the resulting conviction for illegal possession 
of the firearm, arguing that it had been seized improperly. 
 
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the 
trial court‟s denial of Wardlow‟s suppression motion.  The 
Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the intermediate appellate 
court‟s ruling “concluding that the gun should have been 
suppressed because the [police] did not have reasonable 
suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative stop pursuant to 
Terry.”  Id.  The court relied on Florida v Royer, 460 U.S. 
491 (1983), in explaining that “sudden flight in [a high crime 
area] does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry 
stop.”  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122.  Since the United States 
Supreme Court in Royer had held that an individual may 
ignore police questioning and simply go on his/her way, the 
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that “flight may simply be 
an exercise of [that right] and, thus, could not constitute 
reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop.”  Wardlow, 528 
U.S. at 122-23.  The Illinois high court had refused to hold 
that the fact of being in a high crime area supported a finding 
of reasonable suspicion, sufficient to support an investigative 
stop even though such flight “standing alone” would not 
justify the stop.  Id. at 123. 
 
11 
 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed.  That 
Court reasoned that: “unprovoked flight is simply not a mere 
refusal to cooperate.  Flight, by its very nature, is not „going 
about one‟s business‟; in fact, it is just the opposite.” Id. at 
125.  The Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances 
there, Wardlow‟s flight was sufficient to allow the police to 
detain him and investigate further.  Id.  (“Officer Nolan was 
justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal 
activity, and, therefore, in investigating further.”).  However, 
it was the information that the police obtained during the brief 
investigative stop that allowed the brief Terry detention to 
blossom into probable cause for arrest.  Even under the far 
more suspicious circumstances there, Wardlow‟s flight did 
not justify an arrest.  Rather, the Court explained: “Allowing 
officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and 
investigate further is quite consistent with the individual‟s 
right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent 
in the face of police questioning.”  Id. 
 
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
Justice Stevens explained that in reaching its holding, the 
majority had rejected both the bright line per se rule 
advocated by the Government, and the opposing per se rule 
that the defendant advocated. 528 U.S. at 126-27 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The Government 
had argued that the Court should allow a Terry stop whenever 
“anyone . . . flees at the mere sight of a police officer,” and 
the defendant had asked the Court to hold that “the fact that a 
person flees upon seeing . . . police can never, by itself, . . . 
justify a temporary investigative stop.” Id. at 126.  Justice 
Stevens explained: “[t]he Court today wisely endorses neither 
per se rule.  Instead, [it concludes reasonable suspicion] . . .  
must be determined by looking to „the totality of the 
circumstances—the whole picture.” Id. at 126-27. 
 
Justice Stevens further explained that the appropriate 
Terry inquiry when one flees from police must address “the 
degree of suspicion that attaches to a person‟s flight—or,  
more precisely, what commonsense conclusions can be drawn 
[from it].”  Id. at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted).  He 
detailed several possible motivations for flight—some of 
which were innocent and innocuous and some of which were 
not.   Id. at 128-30.   
12 
 
He then quoted century-old precedent to explain why 
flight could not always be equated with guilt:  
 
[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men 
who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly 
from the scene of a crime through fear of being 
apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an 
unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it 
true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that 
“the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the 
righteous are as bold as a lion.”  
 
528 U.S. at 131 (quoting Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 
499, 511 (1896)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  He 
stressed that this was particularly true in view of the modern 
tensions between police and certain demographic groups.  
“Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those 
residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that 
the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, . . . believes that 
contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any 
criminal activity associated with the officer‟s sudden 
presence.”  Id. at 132.9  
 
It is therefore clear from the discussion by both Justice 
Stevens and the majority that Wardlow cannot be used to 
justify stopping everyone who flees from police.  A careful 
reading of the majority‟s opinion makes this abundantly clear.  
The majority stressed the underlying circumstances of the 
investigative detention at issue in upholding the investigative 
stop of Wardlow.  The Court explained:  
 
[Officers] Nolan and Harvey were 
among eight officers in a four-car caravan that 
was converging on an area known for heavy 
narcotics trafficking, and the officers 
anticipated encountering a large number of 
people in the area, including drug customers 
                                              
9
 In a lengthy footnote, Justice Stevens cited several articles 
and studies that document the extent to which Black and 
Latino residents of certain communities are distrustful of 
police and the problems that arise from the distrust.  See id. at 
132 n.7. 
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and individuals serving as lookouts. It was in 
this context that Officer Nolan decided to 
investigate Wardlow after observing him flee.  
 
Id. at 124 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted).  It must be remembered that the context the Court 
was explaining justified a brief investigative stop under Terry.  
The Court did not suggest that flight under those 
circumstances would have been sufficient to arrest Wardlow 
without more; and it is clear from the Court‟s discussion that 
it would not have been adequate for the probable cause 
required for an arrest.  
 
As we noted earlier, when police saw Wardlow, he 
was holding an opaque bag. Since police had every reason to 
believe that the people assembled on the sidewalk included 
drug dealers and their customers, Wardlow‟s flight “in this 
context,” would certainly give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
that he was fleeing because of what was in the bag.  
Accordingly, police could legally investigate and they could 
take reasonable and limited precautions to ensure their safety 
during the brief stop required for that investigation.  There, 
police could not be reasonably sure of their safety during the 
stop without taking steps to determine if Wardlow had a 
weapon in the bag he was carrying. Once they felt what 
appeared to be a weapon, the circumstances of its discovery 
gave them probable cause to believe that Wardlow was 
engaged in illegal activity and he was arrested.  
 
None of these circumstances are present here. This was 
not the proverbial “high crime area,” and police had no reason 
to suspect that Navedo was demonstrating anything other than 
curiosity at the sight of a gun in Pozo‟s backpack.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552, 561 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(Terry stop in an area with a reputation for theft of anhydrous 
ammonia after ten to fifteen previous reported thefts of the 
chemical).  The evidence of a prior shooting in January and a 
report of a domestic disturbance involving a gun in February, 
without more, did not provide sufficient evidence to conclude 
that the area surrounding 315 Park Avenue was a high crime 
area, and as we noted earlier, the District Court made no 
finding that this was a high crime area.  This is also not the 
case in which police officers patrolled an area known for 
14 
 
heavy narcotics trafficking where police expected to 
encounter drug dealers, their customers, or “lookouts” as in 
Wardlow.   
  
 We do not mean to suggest that the outcome would be 
different here if this had happened in a “high crime area,” nor 
do we suggest that police should ignore the overall character 
of a neighborhood when assessing the significance of  
“unprovoked flight.”  We just note that the discussion in 
Wardlow does not suggest that someone‟s unprovoked flight 
will necessarily justify a Terry stop merely because that 
person happens to reside in a high crime area.  In fact, as 
Justice Stevens explains at some length, persons residing in 
such areas may be particularly apprehensive of police for 
reasons totally unrelated to their own involvement in a crime.  
Rather, such flight and the setting in which it occurs, is 
merely one of many factors police may reasonably consider 
before making an investigative stop under Terry.  The flight 
must, however, still be assessed in context with all of the 
circumstances surrounding it.  See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. 
 
But, even absent a finding of a high crime area or other 
relevant characteristics, the Government interprets Wardlow 
to hold that flight in and of itself is sufficient to establish 
probable cause.  In doing so, the Government relies in part on 
United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).  See 
Appellee Br. at 18.  The argument misinterprets Wardlow.  As 
we have previously stated, “the Supreme Court has never held 
that unprovoked flight alone is enough to justify a stop.”  
United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(discussing flight in the context of a vehicle stop).   
 
“While „reasonable suspicion‟ is a less demanding 
standard than probable cause and requires a showing 
considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the 
Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of 
objective justification for making the [initial] stop.”  
Wardlow, 528 U.S at 123.  We have explained that “flight 
upon noticing police, plus some other indicia of wrongdoing, 
can constitute reasonable suspicion.”  Bonner, 363 F.3d at 
217 (emphasis added).  Despite the government‟s reliance on 
Laville, we have not held that mere unprovoked flight from 
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approaching police would support probable cause to arrest, 
nor could we, given the Supreme Court‟s pronouncements.  
 
In Laville, we did state that: “It is well established that 
where police officers reasonably suspect that an individual 
may be engaged in criminal activity, and the individual 
deliberately takes flight when the officers attempt to stop and 
question him, the officers generally no longer have mere 
reasonable suspicion, but probable cause to arrest.”  480 F.3d 
at 195 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
There are two problems with the Government‟s reading of 
Laville.   First, it does not apply here with the force the 
Government believes because, as we have explained, the 
reasonable suspicion supporting the stop focused on Pozo, not 
on Navedo.  Second, the Government‟s position ignores our 
cautionary note that flight will “generally” support probable 
cause.  Whether that higher threshold is reached must, of 
course, turn on an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the flight, as well as the nature of 
the conduct that gave rise to the underlying reasonable 
suspicion for the investigative stop.  
 
In Laville, Virgin Islands police received a telephone 
call informing them that a boat carrying thirty-two 
undocumented aliens had run aground on a reef and that 
several of the aliens were coming ashore.  Id. at 189.  Laville 
was subsequently arrested and convicted of conspiring to 
bring illegal aliens into the United States for financial gain.  
Prior to trial, Laville moved to suppress certain evidence 
arguing that he was arrested without probable cause, and we 
affirmed the District Court‟s denial of that suppression 
motion.  In rejecting Laville‟s argument that his stop and 
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, we explained that 
when police Officer Santos arrived at the wharf in question, 
he confirmed that a boat had run aground and was stranded 
with people still onboard.  Id. at 194.  A witness had pointed 
out four individuals who identified themselves as Cubans 
who had been on the stranded boat and they told the officer 
that others were still onboard.  Id.  The officer confirmed that 
persons suspected of being on the boat were “around the 
corner,” and the witness offered to “point them out.”  Id. at 
194 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The officers then 
walked around the corner and saw Laville and his 
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companions, who fled as the officers approached.  Id. at 194-
95.  “Taking these facts together with all reasonable 
inferences, . . . Santos . . . had, at the very least, reasonable 
suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot.”  Id. at 
195 (citation omitted).  We stated that that reasonable 
suspicion would have justified a brief detention to investigate 
under Terry even absent any additional information.  Id.  
However, Laville‟s subsequent attempt to leave when Santos 
approached under these circumstances “elevated Santos‟s 
reasonable suspicion to the level of probable cause for an 
arrest.”Id.  
  
Contrary to the Government‟s reliance on Laville, the 
facts there demonstrate the type of information police need 
before flight can, by itself, elevate reasonable suspicion to 
probable cause.  We explained that although “[t]he arresting 
officer need not have contemplated the specific offense for 
which the defendant ultimately will be charged,” the officer 
must have “reasonably trustworthy information or 
circumstances within an arresting officer‟s knowledge . . . to 
warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an 
offense has been or is being committed by the person being 
arrested.”  Id. at 194 (emphasis added).  The officers in 
Laville had tips from a citizen informant as to the specific 
identity of a person suspected of entering the country illegally 
and the knowledge that a boat had run aground moments 
before the arrests.  Moreover, the arrest in Laville occurred in 
the Virgin Islands and was therefore tantamount to a border 
search that requires far less justification than an arrest that 
does not implicate the nation‟s interest in the security of its 
borders.  See United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 
1994) (“[W]e perceive the interest of the United States in 
warrantless searches without probable cause at this „internal‟ 
border to be little different from its interest in such searches at 
its international borders.”) (explaining that the geographical 
location of the Virgin Islands meant that police were afforded 
greater leeway in conducting warrantless searches).
10
  The 
facts here are a far cry from the circumstances that justified 
the stop and arrest in Laville.   
                                              
10
  In Hyde, we upheld the constitutionality of suspicionless 
customs checkpoints at the airports in the Virgin Islands.  
Hyde, 37 F.3d at 117, 123.  
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Our holding today reiterates that unprovoked flight, 
without more, can not elevate reasonable suspicion to detain 
and investigate into the probable cause required for an arrest.  
Rather, a person whom police approach is free to avoid a 
potential encounter with police by leaving the scene, and the 
rate of acceleration of the person‟s gate as s/he leaves away is 
far too ephemeral a gauge to support a finding of probable 
cause, absent some other indicia of involvement in criminal 
activity.  See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991); 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98 (“The person approached, 
however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he 
may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his 
way.  He may not be detained even momentarily without 
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to 
listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those 
grounds.” (citations omitted)).  Unprovoked flight can only 
elevate reasonable suspicion to probable cause if police have 
“reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances” to 
believe that an individual is engaged in criminal activity, as 
was the case in Laville.  480 F.3d at 194. 
 
As discussed at length above, none of those 
circumstances are present here.  The police had no reason to 
suspect that Navedo was himself involved in criminal 
activity, and even if they had appropriately formed such a 
suspicion, they would only have been entitled to detain and 
investigate, not arrest.  We conclude, therefore, that the police 
lacked probable cause to arrest Navedo under the 
circumstances here and that the District Court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress the physical evidence that was 
seized following that arrest. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will remand this 
case to the District Court with instructions that it vacate the 
order denying Navedo‟s motion to suppress.11  
                                              
11
 Since we conclude that the arrest was not supported by 
probable cause, we need not reach Navedo‟s argument that 
the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered 
his apartment building during the chase that preceded his 
arrest.  
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USA v. Navedo, No. 11-3413 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 The majority reverses the District Court‘s decision to 
deny Alexander Navedo‘s motion to suppress evidence after 
finding that Newark police officers Saul De La Cruz and 
Henry Suarez (the Officers) did not possess reasonable 
suspicion to believe Navedo was about to engage in criminal 
activity.  My disagreement with that finding necessitates this 
respectful dissent. 
I 
A 
Reasonable suspicion requires ―a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal 
activity.‖  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 
(1981).  While officers may not rely on an ―inchoate . . . 
suspicion or hunch,‖ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), it 
is well-established that they may ―draw on their own 
experience and specialized training to make inferences from 
and deductions about the cumulative information available to 
them that ‗might well elude an untrained person,‘‖ United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (quoting Cortez, 
449 U.S. at 417–18).  Accordingly, reasonable suspicion does 
not require evidence of a crime and need not be based on 
purely nefarious conduct.  ―[E]ven factors independently 
‗susceptible to innocent explanation‘ can collectively amount 
to reasonable suspicion.‖  United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 
239, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273). 
My colleagues conclude that the Officers‘ pre-flight 
observations could not reasonably have led them to suspect 
that Navedo was about to engage in criminal activity.  They 
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do so in spite of their concession that the Officers had 
reasonable suspicion as to another party to the encounter, 
Juan Pozo.  (See Maj. Typescript at 8, 9–10.)  In doing so, the 
majority fails to acknowledge critical portions of the Officers‘ 
testimony and usurps the factfinding province of the District 
Court. 
According to the Officers, both of whom were deemed 
credible by the District Court, around 8:30 p.m., they noticed 
Navedo exit 315 Park Avenue and stand at the top of the 
stairs to his porch.  Officer Suarez testified that drug 
purchasers often wait for deliveries outside their homes in this 
manner.  Moments later, Pozo and another man approached 
Navedo and spoke to him for several minutes; the interaction 
appeared ―cordial‖ and ―friendly.‖  Pozo then opened a 
backpack and began to withdraw what ―appeared [to both 
Officers] to be a gun‖ and a holster.  (JA 36, 64, 88.)  Navedo 
never touched the gun, but he ―lean[ed] forward to see what 
was inside the bag‖ and looked unsurprised to see the gun.  
(JA 51–52, 67, 89.)  Conceding that Navedo ―had not 
engaged in any illegal activity, per se‖ at that point, (JA 46–
47), ―the way [Pozo and Navedo] were both speaking to each 
other, the way the weapon was taken out of the backpack 
being shown, . . . [and] the interest [Navedo] showed towards 
the weapon‖ led Officer De La Cruz to believe that ―a gun 
transaction was going to transpire,‖ (JA 88–89).  The District 
Court explicitly credited De La Cruz‘s testimony that he saw 
Navedo ―being shown the gun in what appeared to be a gun 
transaction.‖  (JA 140–41.) 
I find nothing in the record that would permit us to 
overturn the District Court‘s finding that the Officers 
suspected Pozo and Navedo were about to engage in a gun 
transaction.  Nor can I conclude that it was unreasonable for 
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them to infer that such a gun sale was likely criminal under 
New Jersey law.  In New Jersey, ―[n]o person shall . . . 
receive, purchase, or otherwise acquire a handgun unless [he] 
. . . is licensed as a dealer . . . or has first secured a permit to 
purchase a handgun.‖  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-3(a).  
Crucially, when the legality of a gun transaction, or even 
mere possession, ―depends on . . . a license or permit[,]‖ New 
Jersey law ―presume[s] that [the individual involved] does not 
possess such a license or permit . . . until he establishes to the 
contrary.‖  Id. § 2C:39-2(b).  Therefore, the Officers‘ 
suspicion that Pozo‘s and Navedo‘s actions denoted illegal 
enterprise was reasonable.
1
 
                                              
1
 That reasonable suspicion existed does not mean the 
Officers required such suspicion at the time they approached 
Navedo‘s porch.  ―A seizure does not occur every time a 
police officer approaches someone to ask a few questions.  
Such consensual encounters are important tools of law 
enforcement and need not be based on any suspicion of 
wrongdoing.‖  Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 205 (3d 
Cir. 2003); accord United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 
204–05 (2002); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983).  
Officers may ―pose questions, ask for identification, and 
request consent to search luggage—provided they do not 
induce cooperation by coercive means‖—without effecting a 
seizure.  Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201.  Confronted with a so-
called ―consensual encounter,‖ an individual may ―‗decline to 
listen to the questions at all and . . . go on his way.‘‖  United 
States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 498).  Reasonable suspicion is 
required only when officers conduct an investigatory stop 
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B 
After concluding that no reasonable suspicion existed 
as to Navedo, the majority devotes a substantial portion of its 
opinion to explaining that Navedo‘s flight could not, by itself, 
establish probable cause to arrest him.  (See Maj. Typescript 
at 16–20.)  This is undoubtedly correct.  See Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–26 (2000) (indicating that flight 
alone is insufficient to satisfy the lesser standard of 
reasonable suspicion); accord United States v. Bonner, 363 
F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2004) (―[T]he Supreme Court has 
never held that unprovoked flight alone is enough to justify a 
stop.‖).  But because the Officers did have reasonable 
suspicion before Navedo fled, this case turns on whether 
Navedo‘s flight in addition to the facts known to the Officers 
when they approached the porch rose to the level of probable 
                                                                                                     
pursuant to Terry, 392 U.S. 1.  See, e.g., Cortez, 449 U.S. at 
417–18. 
 
Here, the Officers initiated a consensual encounter, 
and Navedo did not merely decline to participate.  See, e.g., 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 497–98.  Nor did Navedo submit to 
subsequent displays of the Officers‘ authority and stop to be 
questioned pursuant to Terry.  Accordingly, under California 
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991), no seizure occurred 
until he was tackled in the doorway to his room.  Thus, the 
Officers‘ reasonable suspicion is relevant only insofar as it 
informs our probable-cause analysis; reasonable suspicion 
was neither necessary to the Officers‘ pre-flight actions nor 
sufficient to render Navedo‘s ultimate seizure and arrest 
constitutional. 
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cause.  See United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187, 195 (3d 
Cir. 2007); cf. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (holding that flight 
combined with other suspicious circumstances can create 
reasonable suspicion).  I believe our decision in Laville 
governs our analysis of whether the Officers had probable 
cause to arrest Navedo. 
In Laville, an eyewitness on a wharf in the Virgin 
Islands had reported to police that a boat had run aground and 
illegal aliens were coming ashore.  480 F.3d at 189.  When 
police responded to the scene, the witness was able to point 
out four of the recently arrived individuals sitting on a nearby 
boardwalk.  Id.  Those individuals informed police that they 
were Cuban and that other aliens who had arrived on the 
beach with them were still in the area.  Id.  The eyewitness 
offered to identify several of the aliens he claimed were 
around a corner from the boardwalk.  Id.  When police 
approached three men the eyewitness had identified, the men 
―stood up and started walking away really fast.‖  Id. at 190.  
Soon after, the men began running.  Id.  When Laville, one of 
the fleeing suspects, yielded to an officer yelling at him to 
stop, he was arrested.  Id.  In reviewing the constitutionality 
of Laville‘s arrest, we concluded that ―by the time [the 
officer] approached Laville and his companions on the 
boardwalk, he had, at the very least, reasonable suspicion to 
believe that criminal activity was afoot.‖  Id. at 195.  It 
followed that ―when Laville fled at the sight of the 
approaching officers, [they] no longer merely had reasonable 
suspicion . . . ; [they] now had probable cause to make an 
arrest.‖  Id.  We explained that ―‗where police officers 
reasonably suspect that an individual may be engaged in 
criminal activity, and the individual deliberately takes flight 
when the officers attempt to stop and question him, the 
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officers generally no longer have mere reasonable suspicion, 
but probable cause to arrest.‘‖2  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 705 (1985) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
I agree with the majority that whether reasonable 
suspicion escalates to probable cause when a suspect flees 
police is context-dependent and must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.  In the Supreme Court‘s words, 
―deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of 
strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and 
when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the 
officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are 
proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an 
arrest.‖  Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66–67 (1968) 
(emphasis added); accord United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 
1072, 1077 (3d Cir. 1990).  ―Headlong flight—wherever it 
occurs—is the consummate act of evasion:  It is not 
necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly 
suggestive of such.‖  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. 
I also agree that suspects may at times run from police 
for innocent reasons.   For example, where the investigating 
officer ―insufficiently or unclearly identifies his office or his 
mission,‖ ―the [suspect‘s] flight . . . must be regarded as 
ambiguous conduct.‖  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
                                              
2
 Other circuits have likewise concluded that 
reasonable suspicion may escalate to probable cause upon the 
suspect‘s flight from police.  See Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 
F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Dotson, 49 F.3d 
227 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561 
(10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 
F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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471, 482 (1963).  But that is not what occurred in this case.  
Here, although the Officers were dressed in plain clothes, 
they displayed their badges and verbally identified themselves 
as Newark police officers.  Accordingly, the Officers could 
reasonably interpret Navedo‘s immediate flight as evidence of 
a guilty conscience. 
As in Laville, the Officers here had information 
suggesting the possibility of a crime in progress before they 
approached the suspects.  The conduct underlying their 
suspicions was not itself per se illegal, but their professional 
experience suggested that criminal activity was afoot.  The 
Officers saw Navedo waiting on his front porch, where he 
appeared to be expecting someone.  They deemed this 
behavior consistent with narcotics sales protocols based on 
their law enforcement expertise.  They observed Pozo‘s 
arrival with a backpack, the ensuing conversation, Pozo‘s 
display of what appeared to be a gun, and Navedo‘s 
expression of interest in the gun.  Instead of receiving 
information from an eyewitness as did the police in Laville, 
here the Officers personally observed facts that led them to 
possess reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.  
The majority attempts to distinguish Laville by analogizing 
the arrest there to ―a border search that requires far less 
justification.‖  (Maj. Typescript at 19.)  But the word 
―border‖ does not even appear in our opinion in Laville.  
There we applied the usual probable-cause standard and 
concluded that it had been satisfied.  480 F.3d at 194–95.  
Probable cause has likewise been established in this case. 
After concluding that the Officers‘ reasonable 
suspicion became probable cause when Navedo fled, the 
question becomes whether the Officers were authorized to 
pursue Navedo into 315 Park Avenue.  I would hold that the 
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Officers‘ ―hot pursuit‖ of Navedo into his apartment building 
constituted a valid exigent circumstance that permitted them 
to disregard the warrant requirement.
3
  See, e.g., Kentucky v. 
King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011); United States v. Santana, 
427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (holding that where probable 
cause to arrest exists, ―a suspect may not defeat an arrest 
which has been set in motion in a public place, and is 
therefore proper . . . , by the expedient of escaping to a private 
place‖).  ―Hot pursuit‖ need not involve ―an extended hue and 
cry ‗in and about (the) public streets.‘‖  Santana, 427 U.S. at 
42–43.  ―The fact that [a] pursuit . . . end[s] almost as soon as 
it beg[ins]‖ because a suspect flees into and is apprehended 
just inside his own home does not ―render it any the less a 
‗hot pursuit‘ sufficient to justify the warrantless entry.‖  Id. at 
                                              
3
 Due to the nature of Navedo‘s apartment building, 
whether he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy—a 
necessary predicate to his invocation of the exclusionary 
rule—might have presented a close question in this case.  See 
United States v. Correa, 653 F.3d 187, 188–90 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(―[A] resident of [a] . . . multi-unit apartment building lacks 
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
building‘s common areas‖ even where there is a ―locked 
exterior door.‖).  But the Government waived this standing 
argument by failing to raise it in the District Court.  E.g., 
United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir. 2010) (It 
is ―well-established . . . that arguments not raised in the 
district courts are waived on appeal . . . [and] [t]his general 
principle applies fully to criminal cases involving motions to 
suppress.‖); United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 552 n.11 
(3d Cir. 2010) (Standing is ―subject to the ordinary rule that 
an argument not raised in the district court is waived on 
appeal.‖). 
 9 
 
43.  It matters not that Navedo had only to take a few steps 
before he was inside his building or that he was tackled and 
arrested just moments into the chase.  Officers suspected him 
of an illegal gun transaction and knew of at least one gun on 
the scene, which justified immediate action.  See Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 751 (1984); United States v. Ball, 
90 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1996). 
The two requisites for a warrantless arrest in the 
home—probable cause and exigent circumstances—were 
established by the Government in this case.  See Welsh, 466 
U.S. at 749–50; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586–90 
(1980); Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006).  
And because the firearms evidence Navedo sought to 
suppress was in plain view from the Officers‘ lawful vantage 
point the instant they tackled Navedo, it was admissible. 
II 
 For the foregoing reasons, I would uphold the District 
Court‘s denial of Navedo‘s suppression motion and affirm the 
judgment of conviction. 
